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Abstract
The Phillips curve has flattened in Spain over 1995-2006: unemployment has
fallen by 15 percentage points, with roughly constant inflation. This change has
been much more pronounced than elsewhere. We argue that this stems from the
immigration boom in Spain over this period. We show that the New Keynesian
Phillips curve is shifted by immigration if natives’ and immigrants’ labor supply
elasticities and bargaining power differ. Estimation of this curve for Spain indicates
that the fall in unemployment since 1995 would have led to an annual increase in
inflation of 2.5 percentage points if it had not been largely offset by immigration.
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1 Introduction
Over the period 1995-2006, Spanish unemployment has decreased by almost 15 percent-
age points, from 22% to 8%, while inflation has remained subdued, falling first from
4% to 2% in the run-up to European Monetary Union (EMU) and then moving back
again to 3-4% since the 2000s. Thus, as depicted in Figure 1, there have been remark-
able changes in the position and slope of the Spanish Phillips curve (henceforth, PC),
which has shifted inwards and become much flatter. These trends have been shared by
many other countries over that period. For instance, the fall in the inflation rate and its
volatility in Spain is very similar to those in the Euro area.1 Spain is however atypical
in that the favorable inflation developments have coincided with a fall in unemployment
which is much larger than the average 2.5 percentage-point drop in the Euro area.
The causes of the reduction in Spanish unemployment since the mid-1990s have been
analyzed to some extent elsewhere (see, e.g., Bentolila and Jimeno, 2006). However, the
changes in the long-run level of inflation and its short-run tradeoff with unemployment
remain largely unexplored. Most of the standard stories proposed to explain the recent
joint evolution of inflation and unemployment in other countries do not seem very useful
in the case of Spain. For instance, while structural unemployment has clearly fallen,
it is difficult to identify key labor market reforms that could explain such a large re-
duction and hence sustain a lower level of long-run inflation at current unemployment
rates. Next, a rise in the productivity growth rate, which has been proposed to explain
the improved inflation-unemployment tradeoff in the United States (Ball and Moffitt,
2001), does not fit the Spanish experience either. Indeed, over the last decade, produc-
tivity growth in Spain has, if anything, fallen, being among the lowest in the European
Union nowadays. Likewise, explanations based on the effects of monetary policy on real
activity (Karanassou et al., 2002, and Karanassou and Snower, 2007) require extreme
assumptions leading to the existence of a non-vertical PC in the long run. It has also
been argued that the opening of both the trade and the capital accounts lead to a flat-
1The decline in inflation volatility has happened in many other economies, alongside a decline in
GDP volatility. This is often referred to as the “Great Moderation” (see Bernanke, 2004, for a survey).
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tening of the PC (Razin and Loungani, 2007), although other authors point out that if
globalization increases competition and, hence, makes wages and prices more flexible,
the PC ought to become steeper, not flatter.2 Moreover, despite the noticeable increase
in trade openness since the early 1990s, it is doubtful that it could sustain low infla-
tion on its own, in the face of such a large reduction in unemployment. Finally, EMU
could have contributed to the flattening of the PC, as low inflation expectations became
better anchored. Still, why inflation did not surge with such a dramatic reduction in
unemployment is puzzling.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Recent studies on the inflation rate and its tradeoff with unemployment in Spain
have taken three different approaches. First, the sources of the Spanish persistent pos-
itive inflation differential vis-à-vis the rest of the Euro area have been analyzed within
calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. This type of studies con-
cludes that the differential could be explained either by demand shocks biased towards
non-tradable goods combined with real wage rigidities (López-Salido et al., 2005) or by
fluctuations in productivity growth in the tradable sector (Rabanal, 2006). Secondly,
there is research on the possibility of a non-zero unemployment-inflation tradeoff in the
long-run Spanish PC, which focuses on the interaction between money growth and nom-
inal frictions by estimating reduced-form inflation equations (Karanassou et al., 2002).
Lastly, and closer to our work, Galí and López-Salido (2001) estimate a New Keynesian
PC (NKPC) for the Spanish economy during the disinflation period (1980-1998). They
show that the curve fits the data quite well, though with a relatively high degree of in-
flation persistence, and that the price of imported intermediate goods and labor market
frictions are the key factors driving the dynamics of marginal costs, which determine
inflation jointly with inflation expectations.
None of these studies, however, addresses a recent fundamental change affecting the
Spanish labor market, namely the immigration boom that has taken place since the
mid-1990s. The proportions of foreigners in the Spanish population and labor force were
2See Ball (2006). Further discussion is found in Rogoff (2003) and Bean (2006).
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both around 1% in 1995, while in 2006 they were around 9% and 14%, respectively. As
we will discuss later, there have been very large waves of immigration, specially since
2000, coming mainly from Latin America, North Africa, and Eastern Europe.
In this paper we aim at filling this gap by analyzing the consequences of immigration
for the joint behavior of unemployment and inflation. So far this topic has drawn little
attention in the literature. To our knowledge, only two recent papers tackle it directly.
On the one hand, Razin and Binyamini (2007) show that immigration and outmigration
raise the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand, inducing a flatter PC. On the
other hand, Engler (2007) finds a similar result via temporary outmigration of natives.
Our approach differs from theirs in that we stress other labor-market channels through
which immigration can affect inflation. To the extent that wages are differently deter-
mined for natives and immigrants —for instance if immigrants are less well represented
by labor unions than natives— or insofar as the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure is different for each group —immigrants tend to be more mobile
and more willing to take low-paid jobs than natives— expected marginal costs can fall as
immigration increases. If increased immigration reduces labor costs or the rate at which
they rise, the effect of increased immigration on the position of the Phillips curve, as
well as on aggregate supply, is similar to the effect of a fall in oil prices. Through these
effects, we embed immigration into an otherwise standard NKPC with real wage slug-
gishness which, as Blanchard and Galí (2007) have argued, is a key feature in explaining
the dynamic trade-offs between inflation and unemployment. In this way, we derive a
microfounded inflation equation that is estimated and used to account for the impact of
the immigration boom on the recent evolution of the Spanish PC.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review in more detail
several hypotheses used in the literature to explain the changes in the PC in most major
economies and discuss whether they fit the evidence for Spain. In Section 3 we document
the changes in the Spanish labor market since the mid-1990s, focusing on immigration.
3We do not explore other channels through which immigration may affect prices. For instance, Lach
(2007) finds that the large 1990 wave of immigrants to Israel reduced prices due to their higher price
elasticities and lower search costs than the natives’.
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In Section 4 we derive an NKPC when the labor market is composed of two worker types,
namely immigrants and natives. In Section 5 we discuss the results from estimating the
NKPC with immigration for Spain since the early 1980s. Section 6 contains evidence
about how our proposed NKPC performs at the industry level, given that immigration
is highly concentrated in some industries. Section 7 concludes. Two Appendices gather
some analytical derivations and a description of the data.
2 The joint fall of inflation and unemployment
The recent evolution of inflation and unemployment in Spain brings out three stylized
features: a reduction in inflationary expectations, a large fall in the structural unem-
ployment rate or NAIRU, and a flatter PC. While the fall in inflation expectations is
clearly due to the change in the monetary policy regime in the late 1990s brought forth
by EMU, the factors behind the other two changes are less evident.
According to some estimates, the NAIRU has fallen from about 15% in 1996 to 9%
in 2006 (Izquierdo and Regil, 2006). This is remarkable, as structural policy indicators
do not exhibit important changes. For instance, the reform intensity indicator of Brandt
et al. (2005) for 1994-2004 ranks Spain in the 24th position out of 30 OECD countries.
In fact, considering all institutions usually regarded as relevant in explaining structural
unemployment —tax wedge, employment protection legislation (EPL), unemployment
benefits, wage setting and industrial relations, working-time flexibility, incentives for la-
bor market participation, and product market regulation— Spain only shows noticeable
changes in the strictness of EPL for permanent labor contracts (which has been signifi-
cantly relaxed between 1994 and 2003 according to the OECD —probably a too benign
judgment of a labor reform in 1997) and in product market regulation (an improvement
shared by most other OECD countries).4
As for the unemployment-inflation tradeoff, it has been argued that higher pro-
ductivity growth could reduce the level of inflation at given wages. The basic idea is
that misalignment between wage aspirations and productivity shifts the PC, and it has
4On labor market reforms in Spain see Dolado et al. (2002) and Bentolila and Jimeno (2006).
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been used to rationalize the inward shifts in the United States PC since 1995 (Ball
and Moffitt, 2001). However, since the mid-1990s, when unemployment began to fall
in Spain, the productivity growth rate has also fallen significantly: annual growth in
labor productivity fell from 2.5% in 1981-1994 to 0.4% in 1995-2006, while total factor
productivity (TFP) growth fell from 0.5% to -0.6% over those periods (EU KLEMS
Database, www.euklems.net.).
Lastly, another potential factor driving the fall in inflation is globalization, which
operates through two basic mechanisms: increasing trade integration and global com-
petition, and changing import prices (International Monetary Fund, 2006). As for the
former, the degree of openness (exports plus imports divided by GDP) has indeed in-
creased, but along a long-term trend. Thus, it is far from being a new phenomenon
although it can be argued that its trend tilts up since 1992, coinciding with the onset of
a disinflation episode (see Figure 2). Yet, in our view, the evolution of inflation during
1992-1998 is mostly determined, as in many other European countries, by the nominal
convergence process required to join EMU. Secondly, Figure 3 shows that, although the
growth rate of nominal imported input prices decelerated up to the early 1990s, with
inflation following suit, since then it has fluctuated around a constant mean. This in-
dicates a decoupling from inflation —which keeps declining until 1998. In our empirical
model we will include imported input prices as a determinant of marginal costs and thus
of inflation. In the next section we document another dimension of globalization, widely
understood, which has changed more dramatically in Spain, namely immigration.
FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
3 The immigration boom
In 1991 there were only about 350,000 foreigners living in Spain, but by 2006 the figure
had risen to about 4.1 million, i.e. it went from 1% to 9.3% of total population. The
average annual immigrant flow during 2000-2006 was around 485,000 persons, one of the
largest among developed countries (cfr. 1 and 1.2 millions, respectively, in the European
Union and the United States). This is quite a unique experience. Using comparable
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data from Eurostat, the Spanish yearly net immigration rate over 2000-2004 is equal to
1.3%. No other large or middle-sized European country has sustained such a large inflow
over a 5-year period since 1965 (when data start): the closest figures are 0.9% in Ireland
over the same period and 1% in Portugal over 1975-1979.5 The Spanish experience is
comparable to the Israeli one, not in the surge in the immigration rate to 3.8% in 1990-
91, but rather in the steady flow of 1.2% per year over 1992-2000. Indeed, there have
been clear inward shifts in the Israeli Phillips curve and some flattening post-1992.6
The geographical distribution of immigrants is roughly 24% from the European Union
and 76% from the rest of the world (34% from South America, 20% from Africa, 13%
from Eastern Europe, 5% from Asia, and 4% from other areas).7 Immigrants are over-
represented, vis-à-vis natives, in agriculture (7.4% vs. 5.6% in 2000-2006) and con-
struction (17.8% vs. 11.5%), and they also show high shares in some service industries,
like home services, and hotels and catering. For the most representative group of im-
migrants over the period 1996-2006, namely those aged 20-45 years old from Eastern
Europe, Africa, and Latin America, Fernández and Ortega (2007) report that immi-
grants have slightly less schooling than natives (10.08 vs. 10.35 years, though those
from Africa show a significantly lower figure, 7.5 years). Nevertheless, 39% of them take
jobs for which they are overqualified, vis-à-vis 17% of the natives.8
As seen in Figure 4, immigration flows started to increase around 1996 and acceler-
ated from 2000. Why did this happen precisely at that time? Mostly due to prosperity.
The latest Spanish economic boom began in mid-1990s. More specifically the large fall
in real interest rates during the process of adoption of the euro favored industries with
large and long-lived investments, like construction, which are intensive in unskilled labor.
This favorable demand shift took place precisely at a time when the cohorts of young
unskilled native workers entering the labor market were rather small because, due to
5Countries like Cyprus, Luxembourg or Lichtenstein show similar or higher rates in certain periods.
6We are grateful to Saul Lach for providing the immigration data. For population, the source is
Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, www.cbs.gov.il.
7For a detailed account of recent immigration in Spain see Carrasco et al. (2008) and Dolado and
Vázquez (2007).
8A worker is considered to be overeducated when his/her level of education is above the mean plus
one standard deviation in his/her occupational category.
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low fertility, the Spanish population growth since the mid-1970s had stagnated. Thus,
there was a large excesss demand for unskilled labor which fueled large immigration
flows. As a result, Spain sustained high growth in the 2000s while many other European
countries had low growth. Since 1995 Spanish GDP growth has surpassed the Euro area
average by 1.3% per year while the differential in Spanish employment growth has been
a staggering 2.9%, implying that Spain has created 48% of all net new jobs in the Euro
area (OECD Economic Outlook database, June 2007). Additionally, the progressive rise
in female labor force participation also increased the demand for household services,9
which migrants were ready to provide at low wages. Finally, though there has not been
an active policy of attracting immigrants, several amnesties granted legal residence to
illegal immigrants (1996, 2000/2001, and 2005). These forces, alongside the crises in
several Latin American countries in the early 2000s, the long-standing decline in Africa,
and growing network effects provided strong pull and push effects on immigration.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
It is also worth stressing that in the 2000s the unemployment rate of immigrants
has diverged from the national average, remaining well above that of natives (see Figure
5). The main reason is the sheer size of the inflows. Fernández and Ortega (2007)
examine the labor market assimilation of immigrant workers in Spain, concluding that
they tend to achieve similar unemployment rates as natives about five years after arrival.
Thus, a continuous yearly influx of more than 1% of the labor force was bound to
mechanically increase the average unemployment rate of immigrants. Moreover, even
after their assimilation period, immigrants tend to be over-represented in temporary
jobs, and in construction and certain service industries, all of which are associated with
high turnover rates.10 This means that, even if their labor supply elasticity is lower than
that of natives (as assumed in Section 4 below), we expect migrants to experience higher
frictional unemployment than natives. As a first-pass indication of the potential impact
9The participation rate of native females aged 24-54 rose from 57.5% in 1996 to 67.8% in 2004.
10Fernández and Ortega (2007) report that over 1996-2006 the proportion of employed immigrants
with temporary jobs was 60.7% (versus 33.6% for natives). They also show that immigrants have higher
unemployment rates than natives after controlling for personal characteristics.
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of immigration on the Spanish labor market, note that there is a negative correlation
between real wage growth and the differential between the immigrant and the overall
unemployment rate. While over 1981-1995 average annual real wage growth was equal
to 1.1%, over 1996-2006 it was equal to -0.6%.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Immigrants are likely to have lower bargaining power vis-à-vis employers than natives.
Apart from assimilation handicaps (e.g. in their command of the language), they often
work in industries with lower coverage of collective wage bargaining.11 Their coverage
rate is about 8 points lower than for natives, and the coefficient of correlation across
industries between coverage and the immigrant share of employees is equal to -0.11.
There is a long literature on the effects of immigration on the receiving country’s
labor market. Most studies analyze the impact on employment rates and wages of native
workers.12 Much less attention has been paid to immigration in the macroeconomic
analysis of the labor market and, specifically, to its impact on the NAIRU and the
unemployment-inflation tradeoff. This neglect is probably due to the property of long-
run neutrality of labor supply in standard macroeconomic models of unemployment.
However, assuming some differences between immigrants and natives, there are several
channels through which immigration may affect labor market outcomes. First, there is an
ongoing debate on whether immigrant and native workers are complements or substitutes
in production (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, and Borjas, 2003, respectively). Secondly, the
employment patterns of immigrants and, in particular, their industry composition and
geographical mobility suggest that they have different preferences regarding consumption
and leisure than natives. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Razin and Binyamini (2007)
show that immigration alters the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand, inducing
a flatter PC. Lastly, it is likely that immigrants have a lower bargaining power than
natives in noncompetitive labor markets. Hence, a rise in the immigration flow increases
the labor intensity of production, changes the elasticity of labor supply, and decreases
11The degree of unionization is not available and, moreover, it does not mean much in the Spanish
economy, since collective bargains are extended to all employees in the industry.
12See Card (2001) for the US, Carrasco et al. (2008) for Spain, and Borjas (1999) for a survey.
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the markup of wages over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure. In the next section, we explicitly model how these three effects interact to change
the PC.
4 An NKPC accounting for immigration
In this section we extend the standard analysis of the NKPC to take into account het-
erogeneity across two types of workers with different characteristics, namely immigrants
and natives. We first present the setup of the model and then solve for equilibrium with
real wage rigidity and monopoly power.
4.1 Model setup
As is standard in the literature on the NKPC, we start by assuming an economy with a
continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each producing a differentiated product
(Q) and facing an isoelastic demand with price elasticity  > 1. The production function
is constant returns to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas with two inputs, labor (N) and raw
materials (M). For simplicity, as in Blanchard and Galí (2007) (hereafter BG), we ignore
capital in the following analysis, so that Q should be interpreted stricto sensu as final
output net of capital compensation. The main novelty here is the assumption that the
labor input consists of two components, to be interpreted as native (N1) and immigrant
workers (N2). Since both types of workers are bound to be imperfect substitutes, we
aggregate them into the single labor-input index (N) through a CES function. Hence,
Qt = N1−αt M
α
t (1)
Nρt = δ1N
ρ
1t + δ2N
ρ
2t , (2)
so that σ = (1 − ρ)−1 is the elasticity of substitution between native and immigrant
workers.13
13The assumption of constant returns to scale in (1) can be relaxed to short-run decreasing returns
(αm+ αn < 1), considering that we ignore capital. BG discuss this case and show that the specification
of the NKPC only differs from that derived below in (27), with αm+ αn = 1, in having the differenced
unemployment rate as an additional regressor. This is checked in the empirical estimation below.
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By means of the envelope theorem, marginal costs plus the markup can be expressed
as a function of the labor index as follows (hereafter lowercase letters denote logs of
variables in levels):
mcQ + μp = ω − (q − n)− ln(1− α) + μp, (3)
where ω is the average real wage (i.e. the log of the nominal wage, w, minus the log
of the gross output deflator, pQ), mcQ is the real marginal cost of producing Q, and μp
(= log(/− 1)) is a constant price markup.
We assume that immigrant and native workers are not only different in production
but also in their marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRS),
as given by the following functions, for i = 1, 2,
Ui = lnCi − eξ
N1+φii
1 + φi
,
where Ci is composite consumption (with elasticity of substitution equal to ) and ξ
is a preference parameter. Hence, the marginal rate of substitution, mrs, between
consumption and labor is given by
mrsi = ci + φini + ξ. (4)
Following the discussion in Section 3, it is assumed that the slopes of the labor
supply curves of immigrant and native workers in the wage-employment space differ.
In particular, we proceed in the sequel as if φ2 > φ1. Since the φi are the inverses of
the respective Frisch elasticities of labor supply, this means that the labor supply of
immigrants is taken to be less elastic than that of natives.14 This assumption will be
tested in the empirical section below.
Then, taking a log-approximation of equation (2) around the steady-state, we can
show that average employment and wages, in deviations from steady state, are given by
14This implies that, in the presence of a negative demand shock leading to a positive unemployment
gap (i.e. u2− u > 0), immigrants are more ready to reduce their wages than natives in order to remain
employed. By the same token, if a positive demand shock takes place, immigrants’ wages would increase
by a larger amount, given our linearity assumption. In order to check whether the labor supply curve of
immigrant workers is concave, we will allow for a quadratic term in their relative unemployment when
estimating the NKPC equation (27) below.
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(see Appendix A.1)
n = λn1 + (1− λ)n2
ω = λω1 + (1− λ)ω2, (5)
with λ ' δ1(N1N )ρ = 1 − δ2(IR)ρ, where IR (= N2/N) denotes the steady-state immi-
gration rate defined in terms of employment.
The expressions in (5) would hold exactly if we had assumed a Cobb-Douglas labor
aggregator in equation (2), which is the limit case of the CES function when σ tends to
1. In that case, λ and 1− λ could be interpreted as the distribution parameters δ1 and
δ2, respectively. However, the Cobb-Douglas specification poses at least two problems.
First, it implies that production cannot be carried out without immigrants, which does
not sit well with the very low fraction of employment represented by immigrants at
the beginning of our sample period (0.3%). And secondly, the immigration rate has
increased steadily over time, which renders its steady-state value IR a not well-defined
concept. We could tackle this issue by endogeneizing IR in terms of a Harris-Todaro
non-arbitrage wage condition, so that IR would be implicitly defined by the equality
of expected wages of immigrants in the countries of origin and destination (see Razin
and Binyamini, 2007). However, this route is not viable since at the estimation stage
we would need long time series of immigrants’ wages in all origin countries, which are
unavailable. Another possibility would be to adopt the standard approach advocated by
Galí and Gertler (1999) of using the labor income share to capture the evolution of the
real marginal cost. Given our CES specification in (2), this would imply that the real
marginal cost would be equal to a linear combination of the labor income share and the
relative wage of native and immigrant workers.15 Unfortunately, this route is again not
feasible, since there is no data on wages according to worker nationality for Spain.
Given these caveats, we need to account for time variation in the weighting factors
used to aggregate employment and wages of the two types of workers in (5). To do
so, we take a shortcut by implementing a similar approximation to the one before,
15This is akin to the procedure developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a CES production
function, instead of (1), with labor and raw materials as inputs. They show that, besides the labor
share, the other determinant of real marginal cost is the relative price of the two inputs.
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but this time around the observed values of the ratio N2/N during our sample, rather
than around its steady-state value, N2/N. This yields a time-varying parameter given by
λ(IR) = 1−δ2(IR)ρ, where IR is the observed immigration rate in terms of employment.
Next, we approximate λ(IR) (hereafter, λ for short) by a quadratic function in terms of
the (logged) employment-based immigration rate ir (= n2−n), which arises from using
a second-order Taylor approximation of λ around the Cobb-Douglas case of ρ = 0.16 In
this way, the time variation in λ around λ is captured by changes in ir over the sample
period. As shown in Appendix A.2, this Taylor expansion takes the form
λ ' λ− (1− λ)
µ
ρ ir +
ρ2
2
ir2
¶
, (6)
i.e., an expression which will give rise to interaction terms between one of the explanatory
variables and the two terms in ir when we reach the final specification of the NKPC
(see Section 4.5 below). Hence, in the sequel, we will proceed by replacing (5) with the
alternative approximations (where λ is defined as in (6)):
n = λn1 + (1− λ)n2
ω = λω1 + (1− λ)ω2. (7)
4.1.1 Sluggish wages and markups
As in BG, we consider the case where real wages respond sluggishly to labor market
conditions, due to some (unmodeled) imperfection in the labor market. Further, it is
assumed that there are gross wage markups (possibly time varying), denoted (in logs) by
μωi (i = 1, 2). The markups reflect factors like any monopoly power held by workers in
the labor market or distortionary taxes on labor income, which can differ across worker
types. Specifically, it is assumed that real wages of both native and immigrant workers
follow a partial adjustment model of the form (again for i = 1, 2):
ωi = γωi,−1 + (1− γ)(mrsi + μωi ). (8)
Thus, substituting (4) in (8) yields
ωi = γωi,−1 + (1− γ)(ci + φini + ξ + μωi ), (9)
16This resembles the procedure advocated by Kmenta (1967) to estimate CES production functions.
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where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the sluggishness parameter.17 In order to compute the average wage
ω, using (7), it is useful to notice the following result regarding the weighted sum of the
ni terms appearing in the aggregation of the two wages in (9),
λφ1n1 + (1− λ)φ2n2 = ψn+ φ21ir, (10)
where ψ = λφ1 + (1 − λ)φ2, i.e. the average of the inverse labor supply elasticities,
and φ21 = (1 − λ)(φ2 − φ1) > 0. Then, denoting the lag operator by L and noting
that the partial adjustment equations (8) can be rewritten as ωi =
(1−γ)(mrsi+μωi )
1−γL =
mrsi + μωi −
γ∆(mrsi+μωi )
1−γL , the combination of (4) and (9), yields the average wage
ω = q + ψn+ φ21ir + ξ + μ
ω − γ∆(q + ψn+ φ21ir + ξ + μ
ω)
1− γL , (11)
where, in our economy with just consumption goods, average consumption is equal to
output, that is, q = λc1 + (1− λ)c2, and μω = λμω1 + (1− λ)μω2 is the average markup.
From (1), the MRS between labor and raw materials implies that labor productivity
behaves as
q − n = α(m− n) = α(ω − sQ) + α ln
α
1− α,
where sQ is the real price of raw materials (i.e., the log of its nominal price, pm, minus
pQ). Thereby, substituting this expression into (11), yields an equation describing the
dynamic evolution of real wages from the workers’ side:
ω = Γω−1 +
1− Γ
1− α [α ln
α
1− α + (1 + ψ)n+ φ21ir + ξ − αsQ + μ
ω], (12)
with Γ = γ
1−α+γα < 1.
17We also tried an alternative specification in which the persistence parameters differ across workers
whereas their preferences are identical, i.e.,
ωi = γiωi,−1 + (1− γi)(mrs+ μω); i = 1, 2.
When using the aggregation procedure in (6), this yields the following model for wages
ω − (γ1 + γ2)ω−1 + γ1γ2ω−2 = (1− γ1)(1− γ2)(mrs+ μω) +
[λ(γ2 − γ1) + γ1(1− γ2)]∆(mrs+ μω).
This leads to more complicated dynamics in the evolution of the real marginal cost and in the NKPC,
which were rejected by our data. Hence, we opted for the model described in the text.
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4.2 First-best equilibrium
The next step is to derive the first-best price equilibrium in this economy. This corre-
sponds to the case where prices and wages are flexible (γ = 0), and labor and goods
markets are perfectly competitive, i.e. μω = μp = 0. In such an equilibrium, from the
firms’ side, the real aggregate wage would be equal to the marginal product of labor
(mpn), that is, ω = mpn = q− n+ ln(1−α). Similarly, from the workers’ side, the real
wage would be equal to the marginal rate of substitution, that is, ω = q+ψn+φ21ir+ξ.
Therefore, equating both expressions and labeling the first-best equilibrium value of a
generic variable x by xF , we find the following equilibrium condition relating the em-
ployment of natives and immigrants:
(1 + ψ) nF + φ21ir
F
= ln(1− α)− ξ. (13)
4.3 Equilibrium with real wage rigidities and monopoly power
Going back to our economy with labor market frictions and monopolistic power in goods
and labor markets, substitution of (13) into (12) yields the evolution of wage-setting from
the workers’ side,
ω = Γω−1 +
1− Γ
1− α [α lnα+ (1− α) ln(1− α)− αsQ + μ
ω + (1 + ψ)en+ φ21eir], (14)
where en (= n − nF ) and eir (= ir − irF ) are the deviations of n and ir from their
corresponding first-best equilibrium values.
From the firms’ side we have thatmcQ+μp = ω−mpn+μp. Then, inserting (14) into
this expression and using (1) yields the following equation describing the corresponding
dynamic evolution of the real marginal cost of gross output
(1−ΓL)(mcQ+μp) =
(1− Γ)(1 + ψ)
1− α eq+(1−Γ)φ21eir+αΓ∆sQ+(1−Γ)(μω+μp), (15)
where eq = q − qF .
4.4 Unemployment and immigration in the marginal cost
In order to express (15) in terms of observables, namely the unemployment (u) and
immigration rates, we follow BG in assuming that the (logged) labor supplies (ci) and
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the relative labor supply of immigrants vis-à-vis natives (irl = c2 − c1) are implicitly
defined by:
ω = q + ψc+ φ21irl + ξ + μ
ω. (16)
That is, c and irl measure the notional quantities of labor that native and immigrant
workers would like to supply given their current wage, marginal utility of income, and
steady-state wage markup, μω. Hence, from the firms’ side, substitution of (16) into (3),
yields
mcQ + μp = (1 + ψ)c− (c− n) + ξ − ln(1− α) + φ21irl + μω + μp. (17)
Next, making use of the standard approximation u ' c − n, noticing that irl =
(irl − irF ) + irF , and recalling the first-best equilibrium condition (13), we find that
(17) can be rewritten as
mcQ + μp =
1 + ψ
1− αeq + ψu+ φ21(irl − irF ) + μω + μp. (18)
Hence, solving for (1+ψ)eq/(1−α) in (18) and replacing it in (15), yields the following
equation describing the evolution of mcQ+ μp in terms of observables
∆(mcQ + μp) = −
1− Γ
Γ
[ψu+ φ21(u2 − u)− bμω] + α∆sQ, (19)
where bμw = μω−μω, and we have used the result that irl−ir = (c2−c)−(n2−n) ' u2−u,
i.e. the difference between the unemployment rate of immigrants and the aggregate
unemployment rate.
4.4.1 Interaction terms with immigration
The next step is to notice that parameters ψ and φ21 depend on the time-varying weight
λ in (6). Thus we need to express equation (19) in terms of constant parameters. To do
so, notice that, since ψ = φ1 + (1 − λ)(φ2 − φ1) = φ1 + φ21, the linear combination of
unemployment rates given by ψu+ φ21(u2 − u) in (19) can be rewritten as follows (see
Appendix A.2)
ψu+ φ21(u2 − u) = ψu+ φ21(u2 − u) + ρφ21u2ir +
ρ2
2
φ21u2ir
2, (20)
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where ψ = φ1+φ21 and φ21 = (1−λ)(φ2−φ1), with λ interpreted as in (5). Substitution
of (20) into (19) yields an alternative specification of (19) in terms of constant rather
than changing parameters, in which two new interaction terms of u2 with ir and ir2
appear, namely
∆(mcQ+μp) = −
1− Γ
Γ
[ψu+φ21(u2− u)+ ρφ21u2ir+
ρ2
2
φ21u2ir
2− bμω] +α∆sQ. (21)
Finally, deviations of the wage markup from its steady-state value, i.e. bμw 6= 0,
would also alter the marginal cost (see Galí et al., 2001). As explained in Appendix A.3,
in a right-to-manage model of wage determination by firms and unions, among other
alternatives, a labor supply shift due to immigration can be captured by a rise in u2−u
—since it is likely that immigrants will take longer than natives in finding a job— which,
in turn, could be interpreted as implying a fall in bμw. For simplicity, we assume a linear
relationship of the form bμw = −ν(u2 − u), so that (21) becomes:
∆(mcQ+μp) = −
1− Γ
Γ
[ψu+(φ21+ ν)(u2−u)+ρφ21u2ir+
ρ2
2
φ21u2ir
2] +α∆sQ. (22)
Notice that the term in u2−u plus the two interaction terms in u2 and ir are the new
variables that our model adds to the specification proposed by BG (2007) in a similar
model without immigration. The intuition behind these novel effects is as follows. First,
insofar as the unemployment rate of immigrants is higher than the unemployment rate of
natives, this will induce a reduction in the marginal cost both via lower wages —because
immigrants have a less elastic labor supply than natives—18 and through a reduction in
the wage markup set by unions. Further, in our model the interaction terms give rise
to the convenient property that the effects of the u2 − u gap depend on the size of the
immigration rate in the economy: the higher is the immigration rate the larger will
be the reduction in inflation brought about by the unemployment rate differential. In
other words, these effects on the marginal cost will be larger in economies with large
immigration than in those with low immigration.
18Think of a negative labor demand shift: wages fall more the less elastic is labor supply. Here the
shift is one that reduces immigrants’ employment more than natives’.
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4.4.2 Gross output and GDP deflators
Before turning to the final specification of the NKPC equation, a final issue to be ad-
dressed is that, according to our interpretation of Q in (1), equation (22) yields the
determinants of the marginal cost of producing gross output, rather than value added
(GDP). Since a time series of the gross output deflator, pQ, is not available for Spain,
we need to reinterpret (22) in terms of the GDP deflator, p, which is the series used
in the empirical section below. The assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function
in (1) implies separability between raw materials and the labor input used to produce
GDP. Hence, it follows that ∆(mcQ + μp) = ∆(mc+ μp), where mc is the real marginal
cost of producing GDP. Consequently, the only variable in the right-hand-side of (22)
that needs to be changed is the real price of raw materials, sQ, which was deflated by
pQ. To replace pQ by p in this real price, we make use of the fact the former price index
is implicitly defined by pQ = (1 − χ)p + χpm or pQ = p + χsm, where s = pm − p and
χ is the share of imports in nominal gross output, as reported in the national accounts.
Hence, the changes in sQ and s are related by
∆sQ = ∆s− (∆pQ −∆p) = ∆s− χ(∆pm −∆p) = (1− χ)∆s. (23)
Substitution of (23) into (22) yields the final specification of the real marginal cost
of producing GDP
∆(mc+μp) = −1− Γ
Γ
[ψu+(φ21+ν)(u2−u)+ρφ21u2ir+
ρ2
2
φ21u2ir
2]+α(1−χ)∆s. (24)
Notice that there is a difference between the shares of raw materials α and χ. As
argued above, we have that χ = PmM/PQQ, whereas, denoting capital compensation
by rK, α = PmM/(PQQ− rK), since capital has been ignored as an input of Q in (1).
Therefore, χ < α. In any case, the coefficient on ∆s in the above equation is positive
since α(1− χ) > 0.
An important feature of (23) is that the marginal cost of producing GDP has a unit
root as long as 0 < Γ < 1, i.e. 0 < γ < 1. As will be shown below, this implies that the
NKPC has the appealing property that inflation is in the long run independent of real
factors, which only influence the change in inflation. As explained in Appendix A.4, the
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insight behind this property is the presence of real rigidities, either in wages (as in the
present model) or in price setting.
4.5 Alternative specifications of the NKPC
Once the evolution of the real marginal cost has been derived, the last step is to obtain an
NKPC linking it to inflation. For that, we use the two well-known alternatives proposed
by Galí and Gertler (1999): the forward-looking model (FNPC) and the hybrid (i.e., a
combination of forward and backward-looking price-setters) model (HNPC). These two
specifications are given (introducing time subscripts), respectively, by
πt = βEtπt+1 + κf(mct + μp) (25)
πt =
βθ
τ
Etπt+1 +
ς
τ
πt−1 +
κh
τ
(mct + μp), (26)
where πt (≡ pt−pt−1) is the inflation rate in period t, Etπt+1 is the (rational) expectation
of inflation in t+1 conditional on all information available up to t, κf = (1−βθ)(1−θ)/θ,
κh = (1− ς)(1− βθ)(1− θ), and τ = θ + ς[1− θ(1− β)]. In these expressions, β is the
discount rate, 1− θ is the probability that firms are allowed to optimally reset prices in
period t according to Calvo’s (1983) model, and ς is the proportion of firms which use
the simple backward-looking rule of thumb proposed by Galí and Gertler (1999).19
Substituting (22) into (25) and (26) yields the two final specifications of the NKPC
with immigration that we estimate below. The forward-looking PC with immigration
(FNPCI) is
πt = ψ
f
1Etπt+1 + ψ
f
2πt−1 −
(1− Γ)κf
(1 + β)Γ
[ψut + (φ21 + ν)(u2t − ut)
+ρφ21u2tirt +
ρ2
2
φ21u2tir
2
t ] +
α(1− χ)κf
1 + β
∆st, (27)
with ψf1 = β/(1 + β) and ψ
f
2 = 1/(1 + β). Hence, everything else equal, (27) establishes
a tradeoff between the change in inflation, ∆π, and the unemployment rate, u. In this
specification both the intercept and the slope (with respect to ut) of the standard PC
are shifted by the presence of immigrants. In effect, in the absence of immigration (i.e.
19As discussed in Appendix A.4 a similar NKPC can be derived using Rotemberg’s (1982) quadratic
adjustment cost model of changing prices.
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φ21 = ν = 0 and λ = 1), the slope of the PC in the (∆π, u) plane will be −
κf (1−Γ)
Γ(1+β) φ1,
since ψ = φ1 when φ21 = 0, as in BG. By contrast, with immigration, for given values
of u2 and ir, the slope becomes −κf (1−Γ)Γ(1+β)
¡
ψ − φ21 − ν
¢
= −κf (1−Γ)Γ(1+β) (φ1 − ν) so that
the PC is flatter than in the previous case. Likewise, with immigration the intercept
shifts downwards by −κf (1−Γ)Γ(1+β) [
¡
φ21 − ν
¢
u2t+ρφ21u2tirt+
ρ2
2
φ21u2tirt2]. Notice that both
changes are therefore in line with the evolution of the Spanish PC during the last decade
or so, as shown in Figure 1.
The hybrid PC with immigration (HNPCI), in turn, becomes:
πt = ψh1Etπt+1 + ψ
h
2πt−1 + ψ
h
3πt−2 −
τ(1− Γ)κh
(τ + βθ)Γ
[ψut + (φ21 + ν)(u2t − ut)
+ρφ21u2tirt +
ρ2
2
φ21u2tir
2
t ] +
ατ(1− χ)κh
τ + βθ
∆st, (28)
with ψh1 = βθ/(τ+βθ), ψ
h
2 = (τ+ς)/(τ+βθ), and ψ
h
3 = −ς/(τ+βθ). Thus, ψh1+ψh2+ψh3 =
1, so that, as before, the NKPC becomes vertical in the long run.
Inspection of (27) shows that this specification leads to the presence of forward and
backward components of inflation in the NKPC without having to rely on the existence
of firms which use a simple backward-looking rule of thumb to set prices. By contrast,
when this type of firms is considered in (28), the backward component of inflation has
two lags, the first one with a positive coefficient and the second one with a negative
coefficient. These implications will be used to discriminate between these two alternative
specifications of the NKPC.
Given the long-run neutrality property, we can define the concept of fundamental
change of inflation, ∆π∗t , along the lines of Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí et al.
(2001), to then integrate this variable forward in order to compute the fundamental
level of inflation, π∗t . In what follows we illustrate this procedure with the FNPCI
specification, since the approach for the HNPCI is similar but more cumbersome. First,
by iterating (27) forward, we obtain
∆π∗t = (1 + β)
∞X
j=0
βjEt{bxt+j | zt}, (29)
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where in our empirical application, zt = [bxt, bxt−1, bxt−2, πt, πt−1, πt−2] and
bxt = −(1− Γ)κf
(1 + β)Γ
[ψut + (φ21 + ν)(u2t − ut)
+ρφ21u2tirt +
ρ2
2
φ21u2tir
2
t ] +
α(1− χ)κf
1 + β
∆st.
Next, we construct bxt using the coefficients in our estimated FNPCI and, to compute
forecasts of its future values, we run a second-order vector autoregression of the bivariate
system formed by ∆πt and bxt. Letting A denote the companion matrix of the VAR(1)
representation of zt, we have that Et{bxt+j | zt} = e01Ajzt, where e1 is a vector with 1 in
its first position and zeros elsewhere. Hence:
∆π∗t = (1 + β)e
0
1(I − βA)−1zt, (30)
using the standard result that Σ∞j=0β
jAj = (I − βA)−1 for a matrix A with eigenvalues
less that unity.
5 Empirical results
In this section we present our estimates of the model. We estimate first the forward-
looking specification in equation (27):
Et{[πt−α1πt+1−α2πt−1−α3ut−α4(u2t−ut)−α5u2tirt−α6u2tir2t −α7∆st] Zt}, (31)
by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), using a set of instruments, Zt, consist-
ing of a constant and, as is standard in the literature (see e.g. Galí et al., 2003), four
lags of the following variables: the inflation rate (πt), the relative unemployment rate
of immigrants (u2t − ut), the log share of immigrants in employment (irt), the inflation
rate of imported inputs (∆st) —which proxies for the total intermediate input prices that
appear in the model—, and the labor income share. We also include two lags of the
following variables: cyclical output (with the trend estimated with the Hodrick-Prescott
filter using a parameter of 1,600) and of an index of the degree of globalization of the
Spanish economy.20 Detailed definitions of all variables appear in Appendix B. The data
20The higher the degree of globalization, the higher should be the immigrant flow, e.g. attracted by
foreign investment.
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start in 1980:1 but given the lead and lags involved, our effective estimation period is
1982:1-2006:3. There is no data on the split of the labor force between natives and immi-
grants before 1987:2, which forces us to assume that they had the same unemployment
rate through that date. However, this is not an important limitation since during that
period immigration only represented 0.3% of the labor force on average.
Column (1) in Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients in the unrestricted specifi-
cation of equation (27). All coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected
signs. In particular, the relative immigrant unemployment rate and the interactions of
the immigrants’ unemployment rate with their (logged) share in employment and its
square all have negative effects on inflation, as predicted by the model. In other words,
the negative signs on these estimated coefficients indicate that our claim that immigrants
have a lower labor supply elastiticy than natives (φ21 > 0) is strongly supported by the
data. The unrestricted value of the discount rate β implied by the coefficient on lagged
inflation is 0.972, which is higher and more realistic than those found in the literature.
For instance, Galí et al. (2003) find values between 0.84 and 0.92 for the Euro area and
Galí and López-Salido (2001) between 0.75 and 0.85 for Spain over 1990-1998. To check
whether this model is appropriate, we perform several tests of our proposed specifica-
tion in (27) against the most relevant modelling alternatives discussed before, namely:
(i) constant vs. decreasing returns to scale in (1) (see footnote 11), (ii) a linear vs. a
concave shape of immigrant workers’ labor supply (see footnote 12), and (iii) the un-
employment rate gap against the labor force differential as the determinant of the wage
markup (see Appendix A.3). As regards (i), following BG (Appendix 3), we included
the first differences of ut and u2t − ut as additional regressors in (27) and tested for the
joint significance of their coefficients; this yielded a p-value of 0.132 in the corresponding
χ2(2) test, so that we are not able to reject the null of constant returns to scale. With
regard to (ii), a quadratic term in u2t−ut was added; again its estimated coefficient was
not statistically significant (t-ratio=1.35).21 Finally, regarding (iii), we added the rela-
21As pointed out earlier, immigrant workers in Spain tend to achieve similar unemployment rates
as natives five years after arrival. Thus, lack of concavity in relative unemployment may mean higher
inflation pressure in the future. However, as also mentioned, even after their assimilation period,
immigrants are over-represented in temporary and low-skilled jobs, for which they are overqualified.
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tive labor force, c2t − ct, to the list of regressors, obtaining once more a non-significant
effect (t-ratio=1.13). In view of these results, we keep (27) as our preferred unrestricted
model, which we use for testing the remaining restrictions implied by the underlying
structural parameters.
In Column (1), the sum of the coefficients on future and lagged inflation is very
close to unity, as implied by the model. A Wald test of this null hypothesis yields a
p-value of 0.22. Thus we impose this restriction to gain efficiency, with a value for the
coefficient on lagged inflation of 0.490, implying a value for β of 0.961. Column (2)
shows the restricted estimates, which are very similar to those in Column (1). This
set of results allows us to account for the flattening of the standard PC (i.e. the slope
of inflation vis-à-vis unemployment) by the presence of the new term in the relative
unemployment rate of immigrants. The slope falls from -0.112 to -0.032, so that the
PC becomes significantly flatter. We also saw in Figure 1 that there were shifts in the
intercept of the PC. If we take the stable PC traced for the period before the rise in
immigration that is apparent in the graph, i.e. from 1990:1 to 1994:1, and compare its
intercept to that of the subsequent stable locus, from say 1998:4 to 2006:4, we find that
it shifts downwards by 0.44 percentage points per year, due to the introduction of the
three immigration-related variables.22 Alternatively, since average inflation during 1999-
2006 was 3.8%, this implies that, in the absence of immigration, inflation on average
would have been 4.24% exclusively due to this effect. Although this represents about a
12% decrease in annual inflation, it is admittedly not a very large reduction if we look
again at Figure 1. Thus, we can conclude that our estimation results attribute most of
the displacement of the PC due to immigration to the reduction in its slope rather than
to the drop in the intercept.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
This may reduce inflationary pressure since the real unit labor costs associated to these jobs are lower.
22Computed as the difference across averages over those two periods of the expression: bα4u2t +bα5u2tirt + bα6u2tir2t .
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5.1 Structural parameters and fundamental inflation
The estimation of equation (31) yields six estimated coefficients (imposing α1+α2 = 1),
while from (27) we have the following ten free parameters: β, γ, α, χ, θ, λ, φ2, φ1, ρ,
and ν. To check how sensible our estimation is, we calibrate α, χ, and λ to their average
values in the Spanish economy, plus a range of plausible values of the (inverse) Frisch
labor supply elasticities of immigrants and native workers, φ2 and φ1. In this way, we
are able to identify some of the underlying structural parameters: β, θ, ρ, and ν (see
Appendix A.4 for details).23 We obtain a value for θ, the fraction of firms that keep
their prices unchanged per quarter, of 0.810, which is in line with the estimates of Galí
et al. (2003) for the Euro area (from 0.78 to 0.87) and of Galí and López-Salido (2001)
for Spain (from 0.84 to 0.91). Our quarterly estimate of θ implies that the average time
over which a price is fixed, given by 1/(1− θ), is 1.3 years. This is close to the survey
evidence about the price-setting behavior of Spanish firms at the end of our sample
period (2003-2004) reported in Fabiani et al. (2006), according to which the average
duration of unchanged prices in Spain is one year.
As for the remaining parameters, we obtain an elasticity of substitution between
native and immigrant workers of σ = 1.277 (ρ = 0.217), which implies that they are
gross substitutes but not too far from the Cobb-Douglas case (σ = 1). Under the
plausible assumption that φ1 is unity, the implied estimate of the effect of immigration
on the wage markup is ν ' 0.7, being rather robust to a wide range of larger values of
φ2, so that for each percentage point increase in immigration the wage markup decreases
by about 0.7 percentage points. We do not have any other empirical evidence in the
literature to check how sensible this finding is, though it agrees with the fact that the
growth of real wages has been negative since the mid-1990s, when the Spanish economy
entered a long expansion.
In order to check how the model explains the evolution of inflation, we estimate the
23Notice that an estimate of the real wage sluggishness, γ, cannot be directly identified from (27).
However, an indirect estimate can be recovered from the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable,
ωt−1, when estimating by GMM the partial adjustment model for the real wage in (12), with four lags
of the regressors as instruments. This yields bΓ = 0.713 (t-ratio=12.56). Hence, using Γ = γ1−α+γα with
the calibrated value for α = 0.536 (see Appendix A.4), we get bγ = 0.535 (t-ratio=7.43).
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fundamental inflation rate as described in Section 4. To compute forecasts of a single
right-hand side variable determining inflation we use the coefficients presented in column
(2) of Table 1. We then run a second-order vector autoregression of inflation changes
and the deviations of xt from its sample mean, and then apply equation (30), which is
integrated forward. As can be observed, the resulting fundamental inflation, shown in
Figure 6, tracks observed inflation well.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
We now focus on the eight-year period since the beginning of 1999, when Spain joined
the Euro alongside ten other countries. Over this period inflation increased from 2.4%
in 1998:4 to 4.5% in 2001:1 and then steadily fell to 3.5% in 2006:4, while the unemploy-
ment rate fell by 7 percentage points (p.p.), which represents a very favorable tradeoff
for the Spanish economy by historical standards. Over the same period, the relative
unemployment rate of immigrants rose by 3 p.p., the immigrant share in employment
increased by a massive 12 p.p., and the price of imported inputs rose by 0.4 p.p. in net,
with sharp variations up and down.
Over this period fundamental inflation overpredicts actual inflation by 0.4 p.p. an-
nually. Thus, there is still some extra reason for the moderate behavior of inflation
that our model cannot account for. A natural candidate is the anchoring of inflation
expectations due to the operation of the single monetary policy in the Euro area.24
To compute their contribution to fundamental inflation, we shut out in turn the
unemployment rate, the three terms in the immigrant’s unemployment rate, and the
imported input inflation rate in the equation determining the fundamental inflation rate.
The results from this exercise are quite revealing. Rescaling by the average observed
inflation rate of 3.8% per year, we find that without the contribution of the falling
unemployment rate, inflation would have been 2.5 p.p. lower annually whereas, without
the composite contribution of the immigrant unemployment terms, inflation would have
24Indeed, recursive estimation of (27) indicates that from 2002 onwards the coefficient on future
inflation has been smoothly rising whereas the coefficient on lagged inflation has gone down, without
violating the long-run neutrality restriction. However, we have not been able to identify any variable
which helps to pin down these effects.
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been 2.2 p.p. higher on average every year, out of which about 20% (0.44 p.p.) is due
to the drop in the intercept of the PC and the remaining 80% to the chages in its slope.
Thus, over this particular period, about 85% of the increase in inflation derived from
the reduction in the overall unemployment rate was compensated by the effects of the
increase of the unemployment rate of immigrants and their share in employment. Lastly,
the contribution of imported input prices to inflation has been marginal relative to the
effect of immigration, since up the 2006 there have not been major inflationary pressures
from imported raw materials, as has been the case later on.
5.2 Robustness checks
As a robustness check, to account for variability of the price markup (so far assumed
constant) we also introduced cyclical output as an additional regressor in (27), but its
coefficient was not significant (with a t-ratio of 1.20). We also estimate the hybrid NKPC
in equation (28). The results are shown in Column (3) of Table 1. While the coefficients
on the lead and lags of inflation are very close to adding up to 1, it turns out that the
coefficient on πt−2 is positive. This coefficient corresponds to −ς/(τ + βθ) in the model,
thereby implying that the fraction of firms following a rule of thumb, ς, is negative and
therefore meaningless. Imposing the restriction on the sum of coefficients does not solve
this problem either. Thus, we discard the HNPCI specification in favour of the FNPCI
specification.
Lastly, it is worth comparing the performance of our proposed equation with the
open-economy versions of the standard models of the NKPC popularized by Galí and
Gertler (1999). As mentioned above, these are the forward-looking (FNPC) and the hy-
brid (HNPC) equations in (25) and (26), where the real marginal cost is captured by the
(logged) aggregate labor income share, sL, and the relative price of imported materials
and labor, that is: mc = sL + ξ(pm − w). As discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), the parameter ξ is zero when the production function is Cobb-Douglas whereas,
using instead a CES specification, it is positive when the elasticity of substitution be-
tween labor and intermediate goods is above unity, as is often found in the literature.
These equations were applied by Galí and López-Salido (2001) to estimate the NKPC
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for Spain over 1980-1998, yielding a good fit and sensible estimates of the underlying
structural parameters that we also found with our dataset. Since their estimation period
ends before immigration surged, it is interesting to check how these models perform up
to the end of our sample period, 2006:3. Estimating by GMM with their instrument set
yields, for the FNPC:25
πt = 1.050 Etπt+1 — 0.037 sLt + 0.004 (pmt − wt)
(31.10) (3.31) (1.65) (32)
and for the HNPC:
πt = 0.410 Etπt+1 + 0.629 πt−1 + 0.010 sLt — 0.004 (pmt − wt)
(9.41) (17.12) (1.69) (4.23) (33)
where t-ratios are reported in parentheses. In both regressions, the implied value of β
is above unity, violating the restriction that both the coefficient on Etπt+1 (i.e., β) in
(25) and the sum of the coefficients on Etπt+1 and πt−1 (i.e., (βθ+ ζ)/τ) in (26) should
be smaller than 1. Moreover, the estimated coefficient on sLt is negative and significant
in (32) and positive but non-significant in (33), while the coefficient on the relative
price changes sign across the two specifications. These results turn out to be robust to
imposing a value of β in a plausible range between, say, 0.90 and 1. For example, for
β = 0.99, we get, for the FNPC:
πt = 0.99 Etπt+1 — 0.029 sLt + 0.007 (pmt − wt)
(−) (2.92) (5.88) (34)
and for the HNPC:
πt = 0.358 Etπt+1 + 0.639 πt−1 + 0.004 sLt — 0.002 (pmt − wt)
(9.98) (9.98) (0.76) (2.40) (35)
Therefore, applying the standard models of the NKPC —which ignore differences
between immigrant and native workers— does not work once the sample is extended to
include the immigration boom in the Spanish labor market, which provides some further
support to our approach.
25The instruments set includes a constant plus four lags of price and wage inflation, relative prices,
detrended output, and the labor share.
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6 Industry-specific NKPCs
Since the previous results for the aggregate economy seem to confirm the moderating
effect of immigration on inflation, our reasoning would be reinforced if, when estimat-
ing NKPCs at the industry level, this effect was larger for those industries with higher
intensity of immigrant labor. Using information from the Spanish Labor Force Sur-
vey (EPA), we are able to obtain a breakdown of employment by nationality for three
large industries: manufacturing, construction, and services.26 This, together with the
information on industry GDP and price deflators from the Spanish National Accounts,
allows us to compute industry inflation measures, plus industry labor shares and cycli-
cal output, to be used as instrumental variables. Since industry unemployment is not
a well-defined concept, we use aggregate measures of ut and u2t − ut in the industry
specification of equation (27). Nevertheless, to the extent that there is labor mobility
across industries, these aggregate measures of unemployment are bound to capture some
of their traditional disciplinary effects on inflation. Furthermore, u2t is interacted with
the immigration rate, irt, measured for each of the industries.
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the (restricted) FNPCI in these three
industries, where we have imposed the value of the discount factor estimated before, i.e.
β = 0.961, which is not statistically rejected in the unrestricted estimation. Interestingly,
the effect of the relative unemployment rate and the interaction terms is much larger
and significant in the services industry, where 62% of the migrants work (specially in
home services, and hotels and catering), than in construction and manufacturing, where
19% and 12% of immigrants work, respectively (over 2000-2006, where the immigrant
stock starts to be significant). Therefore, this fragmentary evidence seems to go in the
same direction as our previous results.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
26We exclude agriculture because price-setting in this sector is highly affected by subsidies and supply
shocks, and so our model does not describe it well.
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7 Conclusions
This paper examines the evolution of the Phillips curve for the Spanish economy since the
early 1980s. In particular, we focus on what has happened since the late 1990s. Starting
from 1999 the unemployment rate fell by almost 7 percentage points, while inflation
remained relatively subdued around a plateau of 2%-4%. Thus, the slope of the PC has
become much flatter. We argue that this favorable evolution is largely due to the impact
on the labor market of the huge rise in the immigration rate, from 1% of the population
in 1995 to 9.3% in 2006. We derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve accounting for the
effects of immigration, a variable which is found to shift the curve if preferences towards
labor supply or the bargaining power of immigrants and natives differ. In particular,
we find that the relative unemployment rate of immigrants with respect to the national
unemployment rate and the interaction of the immigrant unemployment rate with their
share in employment, in levels and squared, enters the PC, so that both its intercept
and slope is shifted by the presence of immigration.
By estimating our NKPC model with quarterly data for Spain over the period 1982-
2006, we are able to confirm that the variables in which the immigrant unemployment
rate enters are significant determinants of the PC and that conventional models of the
NKPC which treat labor as an homogeneous input do not fit the data well. Our es-
timation results attribute most of the displacement of the PC to the reduction in its
slope, which according to our model is due to the reduction in the bargaining power of
workers induced by immigration, rather than to the drop in the intercept, which com-
prises the other channels considered in the model. We also find that while the fall in the
average unemployment rate over the last 8 years caused the inflation rate to increase by
2.5 percentage points per year, the surge in immigration accounts for an offsetting 2.2
percentage-point drop in the inflation rate per year. Lastly, we also estimate industry-
specific PCs, finding that the impact of the relative immigrant unemployment rate is
larger for industries with a higher share of immigrant employment. These effects may
decay over time, as immigrants integrate and their labor supply behavior becomes closer
to that of natives, but it is too soon to detect such evolution in the case of Spain.
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In this respect, the effect of immigration on inflation is good news for central banks.
Yet, as Bean (2006) argues, the flattening of the PC is rather more of a mixed blessing
since, on the one hand, it implies that demand shocks and policy mistakes will not show
up in large movements of inflation but, on the other, if inflation remains above target,
like is the case nowadays (after this paper was written) a deeper slowdown and/or, as
our results point out, increasing immigration flows —to lower wage inflation pressure—
will be required to bring it down.
29
A Appendix. Some derivations
A.1 Derivation of λ
Consider the following approximation of the (log) deviation of a variable X from its
steady state value, X, where we omit time subscripts for notational simplicity: bx =
ln
¡
X/X
¢ ' (X −X)/X, so that X = X exp(bx) ' X(1 + bx), and for any power a of X,
Xa = X
a
exp(bx) ' X(1 + abx). Then, since aggregate employment is given by (2), use
of the previous approximation yields
N
ρ
(1 + ρbn) = δ1N1ρ(1 + ρbn1) + δ2N2ρ(1 + ρbn2).
Since, in steady state, N
ρ
= δ1N1
ρ
+δ2N2
ρ
and δ1+δ2 = 1, it is straightforward to show
that bn− bn2 = λn(bn1 − bn2),
where λn = δ1
¡
N1/N
¢ρ
.
Next, given (2), the corresponding aggregate wage index, W , satisfies
W−
ρ
1−ρ = δ
1
1−ρ
1 W
− ρ
1−ρ
1 + δ
1
1−ρ
2 W
− ρ
1−ρ
2 .
Using the same steps as before, we obtain the following expression for the (log) deviations
of real wages from steady state,
bω − bω2 = λω(bω1 − bω2),
where λω = δ
1
1−ρ
1 (cW1/W )− ρ1−ρ .
Finally, computing the marginal products in the production function in (1) with
respect to N and N1 in steady state and equating them to W and W 1, implies that
δ1(
N1
N
)−(1−ρ) =
W 1
W
,
whereby
δ1(
N1
N
)ρ = δ
1
1−ρ
1 (
cW1
W
)−
ρ
1−ρ .
Hence, λn = λω ≡ λ = δ1
¡
N1/N
¢ρ
= 1−δ2
¡
N2/N
¢ρ
= 1−δ2
¡
IR
¢ρ
, where IR = N2/N .
A.2 Second-order approximation to λ(IR)
Let us now reinterpret the functional form of λ(IR) derived above as the log-linearized
approximation of the CES aggregator in (2) around any given value of IR, not necessarily
its steady-state value. This yields
λ(IR) = 1− δ2 (IR)ρ ,
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where IR = N2/N . Using a second-order Taylor expansion of (IR)
ρ around ρ = 0, i.e.,
the Cobb-Douglas case, we get
(IR)ρ ' 1 + ρ ir + ρ
2
2
ir2 = 1 + q(ir),
where ir = n2 − n = ln (N2/N) and function q(ir) = ρ ir + ρ
2
2
ir2. Notice that,
around ρ = 0, we can interpret the distributional parameters δ1 and δ2 in (2) as the
weighting factors λ and (1−λ) in (5), since taking logs of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator
N = Nλ1N
1−λ
2 would yield the aggregation rules in (5) in exact terms. Hence, replacing
the approximation into the function λ(IR), implies that
λ(IR) ' λ = 1− (1− λ)[1 + q(ir)] = λ− (1− λ)q(ir),
so that 1− λ becomes
1− λ = (1− λ)[1 + q(ir)].
Let us now examine the two terms in (19) where 1− λ appears:
(i) φ21(u2 − u):
φ21(u2 − u) = (1− λ)(φ2 − φ1)(u2 − u) = (1− λ)[1 + q(ir)](φ2 − φ1)(u2 − u) =
= φ21(u2 − u) + φ21(u2 − u) q(ir),
where φ21 = (1− λ)(φ2 − φ1) > 0.
(ii) ψu:
ψu = [λφ1 + (1− λ)φ2]u = φ1u+ (1− λ)(φ2 − φ1)u =
= φ1u+ (1− λ)[1 + q(ir)](φ2 − φ1)u = (φ1 + φ21)u+ φ21u q(ir).
Finally, the sum of both terms yields:
φ21(u2 − u) + ψu = φ21(u2 − u) + (φ1 + φ21)u+ φ21u2 q(ir).
Thus, the above combination in terms of time-varying parameters, can be written in
terms of constant parameters as long as two interaction terms, involving u2 ir and u2 ir2,
are added to equation (19).
A.3 Determinants of the wage markup
To interpret the influence of migration on the (deviations of the) wage markup, eμw,
it is useful to consider the right-to-manage of wage setting model, where unions and
firms bargain over the wage rate but the firm is free to choose the level of employment
unilaterally (Nickell and Andrews, 1983). As is standard in this model, unions maximize
the following objective function
max
ω
Ω = ωN(ω) + ς[UM −N(w)]ωa,
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where N(ω) denotes labor demand (with N 0(ω) < 0), UM the number of union mem-
bers, and ωa the alternative wage, such that the relative influence of non-employed
union members is ς < 1. The maximization problem results in the following first-order
condition:
N 0(ω)(ω − ςωa) +N = 0,
which is the wage-setting curve. Exogenous shifts in labor supply (L) influence the
position of this curve through their effect on the alternative wage, defined as:
ωa =
N
L
ω + (1− N
L
)bω.
That is, a non-employed worker has a chance to find a job and earn ω or to remain non-
employed and get an unemployment benefit which is a fraction b of the wage. Replacing
this expression into the wage-setting curve gives
N 0(ω)ω[1− bς − ς(1− b)N
L
] +N = 0,
which is upward sloping in the ω − L space if N 00(ω)ω +N 0(ω) < 0, a condition that is
satisfied by linear and concave labor demand functions. The equilibrium values of ω and
N (ω∗ and N∗) are determined by equating the above upward-sloping wage-setting curve
and the downward-sloping labor demand function N 0(ω), where unemployment is given
by L − N∗(ω∗). An increase in labor supply gives rise to rightward shifts of both the
wage-setting curve and the labor supply curve, inducing an unambiguous fall in wages
and an ambiguous effect on unemployment. To the extent that wages are determined in
a non-competitive way in this model, we loosely interpret this reduction in wages as a
fall in the wage markup.
We assume that the labor supply shift is either captured by the differential in the
(logged) labor forces, c2 − c, or by the gap in the unemployment rates, u2 − u, since
migrants often enter unemployment when they arrive. Since c2 − c had a positive and
non-significant estimated coefficient when introduced in the NKPC, we allow u2 − u to
have an extra effect on inflation via variations in bμw, on top of its direct effect on the
marginal cost.
A.4 Long-run neutrality in the NKPC
As shown by Batini et al. (2005), an isomorphic derivation of the NKPC popularized
by Galí and Gertler (1999) stems from the quadratic price adjustment model proposed
by Rotemberg (1982), rather than Calvo’s (1983) model of constant probability of price
changes. This alternative derivation has the advantage of allowing the probability of
each firm resetting its prices to depend on the general level of inflation, since the costs
of not doing so most certainly rise with this general level (see Ball et al., 1988).
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Let us consider the firm’s problem as choosing a price path that solves
min
pt+s
∞X
s=0
βsEt
½
1
2
(pt+s − p∗t+s)2 −
b
2
(pt+s − pt+s−1 − cπat+s−1)2
¾
,
where the optimal price is p∗t+s = μp + mcnt+s, with mcn being the nominal marginal
cost, πa denotes the general level of inflation (taken as given by the firm), and b > 0
and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 are parameters in the loss function. When c = 1, price adjustment
costs fully depend on the deviations from the general level of inflation. Notice that the
quadratic adjustment cost term in price changes implies that the higher is πat+s−1 the
more beneficial it is for firms to reset prices more frequently. The Euler equation (in
period t) of the above minimization yields
βbEtpt+1 − [1− b(1 + β)]pt + bpt−1 = −bpt,
where bpt = p∗t + cbπat−1 − βcbπat .
The standard solution to this Euler equation is
pt = μ1pt−1 + (1− μ1)(1− βμ1)
bpt
1− βμ1L−1
,
where L−1 is the forward expectations operator (e.g. L−sxt = Etxt+s) and μ1 is the
unique stable root of βbμ2 − [1 − b(1 + β)]μ + b = 0. If we now subtract from the
previous solution the following identity
pt−1 ≡ μ1pt−1 + (1− μ1)(1− βμ1)
pt−1
1− βμ1
,
we obtain a new solution in terms of firm’s price inflation, πt (= pt − pt−1):
πt = (1− μ1)(1− βμ1)
mc+ pt + cbπat−1 − βcbπat
1− βμ1L−1
− pt−1
1− βμ1
,
where use has been made of mcnt = mct + pt. Then, since in equilibrium all firms are
identical (so that π = πa), straightforward algebra leads to the following NKPC:
πt =
β
1 + βc
Etπt+1 +
c
1 + βc
πt−1 +
(1− μ1)(1− βμ1)
μ1(1 + βc)
mct.
If 0 < c < 1, this NKPC corresponds to the hybrid case of Galí and Gertler (1999),
where we find that in the long-run steady state, πt = Etπt+1 = πt−1, there is a non-zero
relationship between inflation and the real marginal cost, i.e., π = (1−μ1)(1−βμ1)μ1(1−β)(1−c) mc.
If c = 0, the NKPC is equivalent to the forward-looking case of Galí and Gertler
(1999), such that
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1− μ1)(1− βμ1)
μ1
mct,
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where again, there is a long-run tradeoff given by π = (1−μ1)(1−βμ1)μ1(1−β) mc.
Finally, if c = 1, the NKPC becomes
πt =
β
1 + β
Etπt+1 +
1
1 + β
πt−1 +
(1− μ1)(1− βμ1)
μ1(1 + β)
mct,
so that inflation is independent of the real marginal cost in the long run, although it
influences the change in inflation, i.e., ∆π = (1−μ1)(1−βμ1)μ1(1−β) mc.
As discussed in Section 4.5, an alternative way of obtaining long-run neutrality in
the NKPC is to assume real wage sluggishness.
A.5 Calibration of the parameters
As mentioned in the main text, the estimation of equation (31) yields 6 estimated co-
efficients (imposing that α1 + α2 = 1), while from (27) we have the following 10 free
parameters: β, γ, α, χ, θ, λ, φ2, φ1, ν, and ρ. Thus, we can only attempt to identify
a subset of the structural parameters. As shown below, through calibration of α, χ, λ,
and the (average) labor supply elasticity of natives, φ1, we are able to identify β, θ, ρ,
and ν. The identification procedure for each of these structural parameters involves the
values of the restricted coefficients reported in Table 1 (Column 2) and, in each case, it
can be summarized as follows:
(i) β, from the estimated coefficient on Etπ+1, bψf1 , which is equal to 0.490 (t-
ratio=11.34). Hence, since ψf1 =
β
1+β , the delta method yields
bβ = 0.961 (t-ratio=
11.42).
(ii) θ, from the estimated coefficient of ∆st which is
α(1−χ)κf
(1+β) = 0.005 (t-ratio=2.77),
with κf =
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ , using calibrated values for α and χ, and the estimated value of β
obtained in (i). It is easy to check that this yields a quadratic function in θ. If we take
α = 0.536 and χ = 0.646 —computed as the average shares of imported intermediate
inputs in gross output (α) and in gross output net of capital compensation (χ) in the
Spanish economy over the period 1980-2003 according to the EU KLEMS database
(www.euklems.net)— plus bβ = 0.961, this yields bθ = 0.810 (t-ratio=15.76), whereas the
other root in the quadratic function is larger than unity. For this value of θ, we also getbκf = 0.0517 (t-ratio=4.07).
(iii) ρ, from the ratio between the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms u2ir2
and u2ir. From (27), this ratio yields bρ = 20.00330.0307 = 0.217 (t-ratio=7.62). Hence, the
estimated elasticity of substitution in (2) is given by bσ = 1
1−0.217 = 1.277 (t-ratio=35.47).
(iv) ν, from the ratio of the estimated coefficients on u and u2 − u. This ratio
yields ψ
φ21+ν
= φ1+(1−λ)(φ2−φ1)
(1−λ)(φ2−φ1)+ν
= 1.4. From equations (1) and (2), with δ1 + δ2 = 1, we
have that dQdN1 =
dQ
dN
dN
dNρ δ1ρN
ρ−1
1 =
W1
PQ
and dQdN2 =
dQ
dN
dN
dNρ (1 − δ1)ρN
ρ−1
2 =
W2
PQ
, so that
(N1N2 )
ρ−1 = W1W2 , where respective markup terms would multiply the wage terms under
imperfect competition. If we assume that in steady state N1N2 =
N1/N
N2/N
= 0.97
0.03 = 32.33,
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taking ρ = 0.217, we would have that δ1
1−δ10.06576 =
W1
W2
. Now, to obtain a value for δ1
we need to assume some value for the relative wage (or relative wage plus markup). Let
us take three alternatives: (a)W1/W2 = 1⇒ δ1 = 0.938, (b)W1/W2 = 1.3⇒ δ1 = 0.952,
and (c) W1/W2 = 1.5 ⇒ δ1 = 0.958. Thus, since λ = δ1(N1N )ρ = δ1 (0.97)
0.217, we have:
(a) λ = 0.932, (b) λ = 0.946, and (c) λ = 0.952.
We also need to make some assumption regarding the (inverse) Frisch labor supply
elasticities. If we take a value of 1 for native workers, so that φ1 = 1, as is assumed
in most of the literature on NKPCs (see Galí et al., 2001, and BG), and a value of φ2
= 2, from the above ratio, ψ
φ21+ν
= 1.4, we get: (a) bν = 0.695, (b) bν = 0.698, and
(c) bν = 0.701. Alternatively, if we assume use φ2 = 4, we obtain: (a) bν = 0.658, (b)bν = 0.668, and (c) bν = 0.672. Thus the value given in the text, bν ' 0.7, is quite robust.
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B Appendix. Variable definitions and sources
Nominal and Real GDP. Gross Domestic Product from Spanish National Accounts pro-
duced by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, www.ine.es) Base 1995, linked forward
to Base 2000 at 1995:1 using growth rates. Data are seasonally adjusted and adjusted
for calendar effects by INE.
Inflation. Change in GDP deflator from Spanish National Accounts by INE. Computed
as quarterly change in nominal GDP minus quarterly change in real GDP.
Employment and unemployment for immigrants and natives. From the Spanish Labor
Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa) by INE, linking 1976, 1987, 2001, and 2005
definitions. Data correspond to full-time equivalent jobs. Seasonally adjusted by INE.
Workers with double nationality are considered as immigrants throughout the sample.
There is no data on immigrants before 1987:2, so we assume that they have the same
unemployment rate as natives through that quarter. Seasonally adjusted using Program
TRAMO (Maravall, 2005).
Imported input prices. Price index for imported intermediate inputs from Ministerio
de Economía y Hacienda, SERSIE Database (www.meh.es). Seasonally adjusted using
Program TRAMO.
Labor share. Remuneration of employees multiplied by the ratio of employment to
employees and divided by nominal GDP. This entails assuming that the self-employed
earn the same labor income as employees.
Nominal wage. Remuneration of employees divided by the number of employees. The
latter is constructed following the same procedure as for total employment.
Degree of openness. Real imports plus exports divided by real GDP from INE. Same
procedures as for real GDP.
Index of globalization. This index measures economic globalization, including both ac-
tual flows (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and income payments
to foreigners) and restrictions (hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on inter-
national trade, and capital account restrictions). Source: Swiss Institute for Business
Cycle Research (globalization.kof.ethz.ch), see Dreher (2006).
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Table 1. Forward-looking and hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curves for Spain
Dependent variable: Inflation rate
(1) (2) (3)
FNPCI FNPCI HNPCI
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Future inflation rate 0.493 (7.96) 0.490 (11.34) 0.615 (6.85)
Lagged inflation rate 0.536 (11.35) 0.510 (11.34) 0.354 (4.35)
Twice-lagged inflation 0.119 (2.41)
Unemployment rate rate -0.116 (3.38) -0.112 (3.49) -0.109 (2.31)
Relative immigrant
unemployment rate -0.100 (4.06) -0.080 (3.19) -0.145 (4.52)
Immigrant unemployment rate×
Immigration rate -0.039 (3.52) -0.031 (2.77) -0.049 (3.09)
Immigrant unemployment rate×
Immigration rate squared -0.005 (3.57) -0.003 (2.66) -0.008 (3.29)
∆Real imported input prices 0.004 (2.19) 0.005 (2.77) 0.005 (1.99)
J-statistic (p-value) 0.144 0.146 0.130
Implied parameters:
β — 0.961 (11.42) —
θ — 0.810 (15.76) —
ρ — 0.217 (7.62) —
ν 0.706 (2.67)
Forward-looking (FNPCI) and Hybrid (HNPCI) NKPCs with immigration estimated
by the Generalized Method of Moments. Period: 1982:1-2006:3. No. of observations:
99. t-ratios in parentheses. Instruments: a constant, four lags of the inflation rate, the
relative unemployment rate of immigrants, the log share of immigrants in employment,
the inflation rate of imported inputs, the labor income share, and two lags of cyclical
output and of an index of the degree of globalization of the Spanish economy. See
Appendix B for variable definitions. The implied parameters are estimated calibrating
the following values for the remaining parameters: α = 0.536, χ = 0.646, and φ1 = 1
(see Appendix A.5).
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Table 2. Industry-specific forward-looking new Keynesian Phillips curve for Spain
Dependent variable: Industry inflation rate
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing Construction Services
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Unemployment rate -0.061 (2.18) -0.102 (2.52) -0.093 (2.08)
Relative immigrant
unemployment rate -0.024 (1.03) -0.042 (1.21) -0.061 (2.32)
Immigrant unemployment rate× 0.019 (0.61) -0.017 (1.49) -0.033 (2.36)
Immigration rate
Immigrant unemployment rate× 0.003 (1.10) 0.002 (0.96) -0.006 (1.82)
Immigration rate squared
∆Real imported input prices 0.005 (2.76) 0.011 (1.86) 0.008 (2.16)
J-statistic (p-value) 0.130 0.140 0.150
Forward-Looking NKPCwith immigration (FNPCI) estimated by the GeneralizedMethod
of Moments. Period: 1982:1-2006:3. No. of observations: 99. t-ratios in parentheses.
Instruments: a constant, four lags of the inflation rate, the relative unemployment rate
of immigrants, the log share of immigrants in employment, the inflation rate of imported
inputs, the labor income share, and two lags of cyclical output and of an index of the
degree of globalization of the Spanish economy. See Appendix B for variable definitions.
The coefficients on future and lagged inflation rates are imposed to be 0.49 and 0.51,
respectively, so that β = 0.961, as found in Table 1.
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Figure 1: Inflation and unemployment in Spain, 1980-2006
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Figure 2: Inflation and the degree of openness in Spain, 1980-2006
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Figure 3: Inflation and the growth rate of imported input prices in Spain, 1980-2006
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Figure 4: Inflation and the share of immigrants in the labor force in Spain, 1980-2006
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Figure 5: Unemployment rates of natives and immigrants in Spain, 1987-2006
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Figure 6: Actual and fundamental inflation in Spain, 1981-2006
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